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Taxation, Fines, and Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency and
Market Structure Implications
1.  Introduction
The control of external diseconomies created by worker, consumer, and environmental
exposure to hazardous substances is a pervasive problem.  In many industries, consumers
and workers are routinely exposed to health risks associated with radiation, DES,
cigarette smoking, saccharin, asbestos, dioxin, vinyl chloride, PCB, beta-napthylamine,
benzidine, coke-oven emissions, and various occupational carcinogens arising from the
use of basic materials such as pesticides, petroleum, coal, paraffin, iron ore, nickel, and
chromium.  Other industries involved with petroleum production, nuclear power
generation, metal mining and smelting, pulp milling, and solid waste disposal pose the
threat of contamination through accidental “spills” into the environmental medium.  The
unifying feature of these problems is that the extent of external damages is determined
jointly through the choice of output and safety provision by producers.
Two important forms of externality control in hazardous sectors of the economy
are producer liability rules and direct regulatory control through the use of output (i.e.,
Pigouvian) taxation and fines on injuries.  This paper provides a comparative analysis of
the relative efficiency properties of producer liability rules and regulatory policy in both
short-run and long-run competitive equilibria.  The essential feature of the model is that
the provision of product safety in the hazardous sector is endogenized as a choice
variable of the firm.  The extent or magnitude of external damages can be limited, for
example, by removing carcinogens from consumer products, by following re-entry
guidelines after the application of pesticides, by requiring safety gear for construction
workers, or by implementing better containment measures for solid and liquid waste.2
Given the conceptual unity of worker, consumer, and environmental safety issues,
producer liability rules and regulatory controls are nested in a general model that allows
their comparative properties to be examined.
The theoretical framework, which views producer care as a choice variable of the
firm, falls within a family of papers in the liability literature [see, for example, Hamada
(1976), Shavell (1980), Landes and Posner (1985), and Marino (1988)].  In each of these
papers, producer (or strict) liability achieves social optimality in a long-run competitive
equilibrium, provided that the extent or likelihood of damage is not correlated across
firms (i.e., no externalities exist in the liability functions).  The present analysis supports
this finding that tort liability achieves a first-best resource allocation in the long run, but
finds the choice of regulatory controls to be more problematic.
In an important contribution, two papers by Carlton and Loury (1980, 1986)
discuss the limitations of Pigouvian taxes in long-run equilibria.  For the case of
unavoidable damages, they demonstrate that a Pigouvian tax is inefficient when the
damage function does not depend multiplicatively on the item that is taxed.  This finding,
though certainly important, is limited by the fact that firms typically exert some control
over the extent of external damages through their choice of safety provision.  In the
following section, we revisit the limitations of Pigouvian taxation in a model that allows
competitive firms to invest in product safety measures that reduce the probability of
accidental injury to workers, consumers, and the environment.  It is shown that Pigouvian
taxation fails to achieve a socially optimal outcome in a long-run competitive equilibrium
in which both output and safety provision are taxed (subsidized) according to their
marginal contributions to social damage.  A joint policy involving fines on accidents and3
subsidies on safety provision can achieve a first-best resource allocation; however, the
optimal policy may involve the taxation, not the subsidization, of product safety.
The paper also addresses the effect of increased exposure to tort liability on
market structure.  The existing literature regarding the effects of producer liability on
market structure has focused on the issue of solvency [e.g., Ringleb and Wiggins (1990),
Boyd and Ingberman (1994) and Watts (1998)].  In a recent paper, Ringleb and Wiggins
(1990) examine a wide range of hazardous industries and find that increased exposure to
tort liability tends to stimulate small firm entry.  Their intuition for this effect is that the
entry of firms results through incomplete capitalization and/or through latent risks that
allow small firms to cease production before claims are made.  It is shown here that,
regardless of firm solvency, de novo entry can occur purely through market forces
following an increase in producer liability exposure.  The finding that increased tort
liability induces entry in hazardous sectors, therefore, is not sufficient evidence to support
the hypothesis that firms respond to greater liability exposure through divestiture.
2.  The Model
Consider a simple partial-equilibrium model with n identical competitive firms.  Each
firm produces a homogeneous product with inverse demand given by P(Y), where Y=ny
is total industry output.  Production by each firm in the industry also imposes additional
damages to society, g(y), in the event of an accident.  The expected damage, D, created
by a firm’s production decision is given by  Da g y = ( ) , where a Î[,] 01 , is the probability
in which an accident occurs.  In cases where damages arise through worker exposure to
toxic substances or through environmental “spills”, a may be interpreted as the
probability of product failure, as in Marino (1991).  In cases where external damages4
arise through health risk, a may be interpreted as an inverse measure of product safety,
for example the level of product carcinogenity or the degree of worker exposure to toxic
substances.  To produce y units of output at safety level a, the representative firm incurs
production costs of cay ( , ), where dc a y dy (,) / > 0 and dc a y da (,) / < 0.
In a short-run equilibrium the number of firms is fixed and we can completely
characterize the socially optimal a, y as the solution to
max ( ) ( , ) ( )
a
y















ay () (,) =- .( 2 )
Expression (1) equates the market price with marginal social damage, the sum of
marginal private cost and marginal external cost.  Expression (2) equates total external
damage with the marginal cost of providing product safety.  That is, (2) states that the
socially optimal level of product safety occurs where the marginal cost of investing in
safety measures is equal to total external damage at the equilibrium level of output.
1
In the case of direct regulatory controls, the short run competitive equilibrium
(SRCE) is described with regard to three policy instruments: a tax on output, t, a subsidy
on safety provision (i.e., a tax on “negative” safety), s, and a fine on accidents, f.  We can
completely characterize the SRCE as the solution to
max ( , )
a
y







                                                       
1 A similar result is derived by Marino (1991).5








ay += -(,) . ( 4 )
Proposition 1.  For appropriately chosen policy pairs t,s or f,s, the short-run competitive
equilibrium coincides with the short-run social optimum.
Proof.  It is necessary to show that if a*,y* are a short-run social optimum, then there
exists a policy pair t*,s* or f*,s* such that a*,y* are a short-run competitive equilibrium.
For the case of taxation, suppose a*,y* solve (1) and (2) and define s*=g(y*) and
ta g y *' ( * ) = .  Then, when f=0, it follows immediately from (1) and (2) that a*,y* also
satisfy (3) and (4).
For the case of a fine-subsidy pair, suppose that a*,y* satisfy (1) and (2) and
choose fg y *' ( * ) =  and  () sy g yyg y ** ( * ) * ' ( * ) =- .  For such a f*, it is clear from (1)
that a*,y* will also satisfy (3) when t=0.  To see that a*,y* also satisfy (4), rewrite (2) as
g y s s fy fy
dc
da




ay * * * ( *, *) += - .( 5 )
It is obvious from (5) that a*,y* satisfy (4). Q.E.D.
The result in Proposition 1 is fairly transparent: with two distortions, it is possible
to achieve the social optimum with two policy instruments.  However, the case of fines
on accidents is of some independent interest.  If the purpose of a fine on accidents is to
achieve economic efficiency, rather than to serve as a compensatory mechanism for
injured parties, the optimal per unit fine is assessed according to the marginal damage,6
not the average damage, associated with product failure.  When fines are assessed on
accidents, moreover, the socially optimal policy control may involve the taxation, not the
subsidization, of product safety.  If the marginal damage of each firm’s output exceeds
the average damage at the optimal point, then the first-best policy pair involves a fine on
accidents equal to marginal damage and a tax on product safety equal to the difference
between marginal and average damage.
In the long-run, entry (exit) may occur and the number of firms is endogenous.
Using the definition of the inverse demand curve, we can completely characterize the
long-run social optimum (LRSO) as the solution to





















ay () (,) =- ,( 7 )
yP ny c a y ag y () ( , ) ( ) =+ .( 8 )
With respect to the regulatory controls (t,f,s), we can completely characterize the








ay += -( , ) (10)
yP ny c a y yt as ayf () ( , ) = +++ . (11)
Proposition 2.  There exists no t,s pair such that the long-run competitive equilibrium7
coincides with the long-run social optimum.
Proof.  It is necessary to show that if t is the tax on output and s is the subsidy on product
safety, then if a*,y*,n* satisfy (6), (7), and (8), they will not also satisfy (9), (10), and
(11).  First notice from (6) and (7) that t,s must meet the conditions of Proposition 1 for a
LRSO.  To complete the proof, we must show that t=t* and s=s* will not satisfy (11) for
a*,y*,n*.
Suppose that a*,y*,n* satisfy (9), (10), and (11) and let s*=g(y*) and
ta g y *' ( * ) = .  For such a s*,t* it is clear from (9) and (10) that a*,y*,n* will also satisfy
(6) and (7).  However, for such a tax-subsidy pair, a*,y* will not satisfy (8).  To see this,
rewrite (8) as yP ny c ay ag y yt yt as as * ( * *) ( *, *) * ( *) * * * * * * * * =++ - + - , or,
yP ny c ay yt as agy * ( * *) ( *, *) * * * * * '( *) =+ + -. (12)
From (12) it is apparent that a*,y*,n* will not satisfy (11) when f=0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.  There exists a f,s pair such that the long-run competitive equilibrium
coincides with the long-run social optimum.
Proof.  It is necessary to show that if a*,y*,n* are a long-run social optimum, then there
exists a policy pair f*,s* such that a*,y*,n* are a long-run competitive equilibrium.
Suppose that a*,y*,n* satisfy (6), (7) and (8) and choose  fg y *' ( * ) =  and
() sy g yyg y ** ( * ) * ' ( * ) =- .  For such a f*,s* it is clear from (6) and (7) that a*,y*,n*
also satisfy (9) and (10) when t=0.  To see that a*,y*,n* also satisfy (11), rewrite (8) as
yP ny c ay ag y ayf ayf as as * ( * *) ( *, *) * ( *) * * * * * * * * * * =++ -+ -
or
yP ny c ay as ayf * ( * *) ( *, *) * * * * * =+ + (13)
Clearly, (13) coincides with (11) when t=0. Q.E.D.8
Corollary.  If marginal social damage equals average social damage at y*, then a fine of
fg y *' ( * ) =  on accidents achieves both the short-run and the long-run social optimum.
When firms fail to recognize the external damages associated with product failure,
three sources of inefficiency arise through separate distortions in output level, safety
provision, and the equilibrium number of firms.  Unlike the case of Pigouvian taxation,
the use of accident fines allows the regulator to effectively control three distortions with
only two instruments.  The intuition behind this result is that a fine, which is assessed on
a multiplicative relationship between output and safety provision, creates a non-linearity
between the policy instruments.  An increase in the fine affects both the level of output
and the degree of producer care for the representative firm, while an increase in the
subsidy changes only the marginal valuation of product safety.
For completeness, we next examine the long-run efficiency properties of tort









ay () (,) =- , (15)
yP ny c a y ag y () ( , ) ( ) =+ . (16)
Equations (14), (15), and (16) coincide with (6), (7), and (8).  It follows directly that the
LRSO and LRCE coincide under a system of producer liability rules, hence a producer
liability rule leads to first-best resource allocations in both the short- and the long-run.
2
3.  Structural Implications of a Change in Producer Liability Exposure
                                                       
2 This result is also derived by Hamada (1976), Shavell (1980), and Landes and Posner (1985).9
Unlike previous papers that have focused on the structural implications of producer
liability when firm solvency is important, attention is confined here to the case of a fully
capitalized industry without divestiture incentives.  The results described below
demonstrate that de novo entry in the face of increased producer liability, as observed by
Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) in the 1967-80 period surrounding rapid changes in U.S.
liability law, is consistent with an alternate hypothesis of purely structural change.
Consider, as in Shavell (1980) and Marino (1991), the case in which production
costs increase linearly with output, cya y ca (,) () = , where ca < 0 and c aa >0.  Next,
denote the (inverse) demand elasticity as h =-PY P ' /  and the elasticity of the slope of
the damage function as x = gyg yy y /.
Let q be a shift parameter in the liability function of the representative firm such
that  gg y = (;) q.  Without loss of generality, an increase in producer liability is
represented by the condition gy q q (;) > 0, while an increase (resp. decrease) in the
marginal injury relation is represented by the condition  gy y q q (;) > 0 (resp. < 0).  It is
also helpful to define for future reference the ratio of change in the marginal and average
injury relation, eqq q = gyg y / , as the elasticity of the shift in liability structure.
Proposition 4.  If cya y c ya y (,) (,) = , increased producer exposure to tort liability
(i) increases product safety,
(ii) increases the output of a representative firm if and only if eq <1,
(iii) increases the number of firms if and only if  () () e x h q -> 1/ / ag Py .
Proof. Making the appropriate substitutions in expressions (14), (15), and (16) and
simplifying yields gg yc ya == - / .  Perturbing the conditions for a LRCE in (14), (15),10
and (16), and making use of the envelope theorem gives
nP ag P y
yc
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2 , respectively, where
gq > 0 for an increase in liability exposure.  Inspection of the first two terms completes
parts i and ii.  Noting that the denominator of the third term is negative, entry occurs
following an increase in liability exposure if and only if x hh e q ag P P y +< .
Substituting  gg y y = /  and simplifying completes the proof. Q.E.D.
In response to an increase in liability exposure, firms that internalize tort liability
as a component of production costs change their operating scale to equate marginal and
average cost inclusive of the increased injury expense.  Thus, if the change in the
marginal injury relation exactly coincides with the change in the average injury relation
(eq = 1), increased exposure to tort liability has no effect on the productive scale of a
representative firm.
3  Conversely, the level of output associated with minimum average
cost decreases for a competitive firm whenever the upwards shift in the average cost
curve exceeds the change in marginal cost, as in the case of internalized liability and
eq >1.  For a sufficiently large value of the shift elasticity, the reduction in productive
scale by incumbent firms makes entry attractive despite the increased liability exposure in
                                                       
3 Such a result is familiar to competitive models in which firms choose a single variable (e.g., output)
subject to a linear penalty schedule (e.g., a unit tax).11
the industry.  Entry is more likely to occur in a hazardous sector following an increase in
tort liability when inverse demand is price elastic, the marginal damage function is price
inelastic, and the increase in marginal damage is large relative to the change in average
damage.  Furthermore, de novo entry is more likely when total revenue is large relative to
the total injury associated with product failure, a condition under which firm solvency is
not likely to be an issue.
 Example.  Consider a market with linear demand,  Pn y A n y () =- a, and a quadratic
damage function, gb y =+ b
2 .  Increased exposure to tort liability is represented by an
increase in either b or b.  Suppose that each of n competitive firms has the cost function
cay c y a (,) / = .  Solving equations (14), (15), and (16) for the equilibrium level of output
and safety provision for each firm yields  () yb */ = b
0.5






b .  It is
immediately apparent that the equilibrium output level of each firm is increasing in b and
decreasing in b, while the probability of product failure is decreasing in both b and b.
Thus, regardless of the nature of the increase in producer liability, the level of safety


















, from which it follows directly that entry occurs whenever
the ratio b/b increases in response to the change in liability structure.
The above example indicates that, in general, no clear correspondence can be
drawn between de novo entry and the level of firm solvency.  Specifically, divestiture
incentives are not a necessary condition for entry to occur in a hazardous industry.  The
entry of new firms in response to increased liability exposure leads to qualitative
predictions regarding divestiture only in the case where the average injury relation12
increases to a greater extent than the increase in the marginal injury relation.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The paper has shown that Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve a socially optimal outcome
in a long-run competitive equilibrium in which both output and safety provision are taxed
(subsidized) according to their marginal contributions to social damage.  The analysis
demonstrated that a system of fines on accidents and subsidies (taxes) on product safety
provision are capable of achieving first-best resource allocations; however, the optimal
policy pair assesses a per-unit fine on marginal, not average damages, and potentially
involves the taxation, not the subsidization, of product safety investments.  The analysis
further revealed that tort liability achieves a first-best resource allocation in both long and
short-run equilibria, which highlights the appeal of legal controls in hazardous sectors.
The paper also demonstrated that entry and loss of incumbent market share can
occur purely through market forces following an increase in producer liability.  The
implication of this finding is that a divestiture incentive is not a necessary condition for
small firm entry to occur in response to increased exposure to tort liability.  Entry (exit)
of competitive firms generally occurs following nonuniform changes in the marginal and
average components of the liability function, even when solvency is not an issue.  In
particular, entry occurs when the increased exposure to tort liability sufficiently increases
the marginal injury relation relative to the change in the average injury relation.  The
implications of this result contrast sharply with that of divestiture-induced entry, as the
entry of firms following increased producer exposure to liability is associated with first-
best levels of output and safety provision in the hazardous sector.13
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